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This paper studies optimal monetary policy in a small open economy under flexible prices. The paper's key
innovation is to analyze this question in the context of environments where only a fraction of agents
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three rules: the optimal state contingent monetary policy; the optimal non-state contingent money growth
rule; and the optimal non-state contingent devaluation rate rule. We compare welfare and the volatility of
macro aggregates like consumption, exchange rate, and money under the different rules. One of our key
findings is that amongst non-state contingent rules, policies targeting the exchange rate are, in general, welfare
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Abstract
This paper studies optimal monetary policy in a small open economy under exible prices. The
papers key innovation is to analyze this question in the context of environments where only a
fraction of agents participate in asset market transactions (i.e., asset markets are segmented). In
this environment, we study three rules: the optimal state contingent monetary policy; the optimal
non-state contingent money growth rule; and the optimal non-state contingent devaluation rate
rule. We compare welfare and the volatility of macro aggegates like consumption, exchange rate,
and money under the di¤erent rules. One of our key ndings is that amongst non-state contingent
rules, policies targeting the exchange rate are, in general, welfare dominated by policies which
target monetary aggregates. Crucially, we nd that xed exchange rates are almost never optimal.
On the other hand, under some conditions, a non-state contingent rule like a xed money rule can
even implement the rst-best allocation.
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1 Introduction
The desirability of alternative monetary policies continues to be one of the most analyzed and hotly
debated issues in macroeconomics. If anything, the issue is even of greater relevance for emerging
markets, which experience far greater macroeconomic volatility than industrial countries. Should
emerging markets x the exchange rate to a strong currency or should they let it oat? Should
they be targeting ination and follow Taylor-type rules or should they have a monetary target? In
practice, the range of experiences is not only broad but also varies considerably over time. While
in the early 1990s many emerging countries were following some sort of exchange rate peg (the
10-year Argentinean currency board that started in 1991 being the most prominent example), most
of them switched to more exible arrangements after the 1994 Mexican crisis and the 1997-98
Asian crises. If history is any guide, however, countries dislike large uctuations in exchange rates
and eventually seek to limit them by interventions or interest rates changes (Calvo and Reinhart
(2002)). Hence, it would not be surprising to see a return to less exible arrangements in the near
future. The cross-country and time variation of monetary policy and exchange rate arrangements in
emerging countries is thus remarkable and essentially captures the di¤erent views of policymakers
and international nancial institutions regarding the pros and cons of di¤erent regimes.
The conventional wisdom derived from the literature regarding the choice of exchange rate
regimes is based on the Mundell-Fleming model (i.e., a small open economy with sticky prices
and perfect capital mobility). In such a model, it can be shown (see Calvo (1999) for a simple
derivation) that if the policymakers objective is to minimize output variability, xed exchange
rates are optimal if monetary shocks dominate and exible exchange rates are optimal if real
shocks dominate. As Calvo (1999, p. 4) puts it, this is a result that every well-trained economist
carries on [his/her] tongue. The intuition is simple enough: real shocks require an adjustment in
relative prices which, in the presence of sticky prices, can most easily be e¤ected through changes
in the nominal exchange rate; in contrast, monetary shocks require an adjustment in real money
balances that can be most easily carried out through changes in nominal money balances (which
1
happens endogenously under xed exchange rates). In fact, most of the modern literature on the
choice of exchange rate regimes has considered variations of the Mundell-Fleming model in modern
clothes (rechristened nowadays as new open economy macroeconomics): for instance, Engel and
Devereux (1998) show how the conventional results are sensitive to whether prices are denominated
in the producers or consumers currency and Cespedes, Chang, and Velasco (2000) incorporate
liability dollarization and balance sheets e¤ects and conclude that the standard prescription in
favor of exible exchange rates in response to real shocks is not essentially a¤ected. In a similar
vein, while the literature on monetary policy rules for open economies is more recent, it has been
carried out mostly in the context of sticky-prices model (see, for instance, Clarida, Gali, and Gertler
(2001), Ghironi and Rebucci (2001), and Scmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2000)). In particular, Clarida,
Gali, and Gertler (2001) conclude that Taylor-type rules remain optimal in an open economy though
openness can a¤ect the quantitative magnitude of the responses involved.
The fact that most of the literature on the choice of exchange rate regimes and monetary policy
rules relies on sticky prices models raises a fundamental (though seldom asked) question: are sticky
prices (i.e., frictions in good markets) more relevant in emerging markets than frictions in asset
markets? Given that even for the United States 59 percent of the population (as of 1989) did not
hold interest bearing assets (see Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (2000)) and that, for all the nancial
opening of recent decades, nancial markets in developing countries remain far less sophisticated
than in the United States, it stands to reason clear that nancial markets frictions are pervasive
in developing countries. In this light, it would seem important to understand the implications of
models with nancial markets frictions for the optimal choice of exchange rate regimes and policy
rules. A convenient way of modelling nancial market frictions is to assume that, at any point
in time, some agents do not have access to asset markets (due to, say, a xed cost of entry, lack
of information, and so forth). This so-called asset market segmentation models have been used
widely in the closed macro literature (see, among others, Alvarez and Atkeson (1997), Alvarez,
Lucas, and Webber (2001) and Chatterjee and Corbae (1992)). In a rst paper (Lahiri, Singh, and
Vegh (2006)), we have analyzed the implications of asset market segmentation for the choice of
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exchange rate regimes under both complete and incomplete markets (for agents that have access
to asset markets). We conclude that the policy prescription is exactly the opposite of the one that
follows from the Mundell-Fleming model: when monetary shocks dominate, exible exchange rates
are optimal, whereas when real shock dominate, xed rates are optimal.1 The punchline is that
the choice of xed versus exible should therefore not only depend on the type of shock (monetary
versus real) but also on the type of friction (goods markets versus asset markets).
In this paper, we turn to the more general issue of optimal monetary policy rules (of which a
xed exchange rate or pure oating rate are, of course, particular cases). For analytical simplicity,
we restrict our attention to the case in which agents that have access to asset markets (called
traders) face complete markets. Our rst result of interest is that there are state contingent
rules (based either on the rate of money growth or the rate of devaluation) that can implement the
rst-best equilibrium.2 These rules entail reacting to both output and velocity shocks. Interestingly
enough, the optimal reaction to output shocks is procyclical in the sense that either the rate of
money growth or the rate of devaluation should be raised in good times and lowered in bad times.
Intuitively, this reects the need to insulate non-traders (i.e., those agents with no access to capital
markets) from output uctuations. In the case of the state-contingent money growth rule, this
insulation is achieved by redistributing resources from non-traders to traders in good times and
viceversa in bad times. More specically, by, say, increasing the money supply in good times,
tradersreal money balances increase (since they get a disproportionate amount of money while
the price level increases in proportion to the money injection), which they can use to buy goods from
non-traders. In the case of the state-contingent devaluation rate rule, the insulation is achieved by
1Not surprisingly, our results are in the spirit of an older  and less well-known literature  that analyzed the
choice of exchange rate regimes in models with no capital mobility; see, in particular, Fischer (1977) and Lipschitz
(1978). It is worth noting, however, that these early models fail to capture agent heterogeneity and hence miss the
role of redistributive policies, a key channel in our model.
2Since there is no distortionary taxation in our model  and in the absence of net initial assets  the rst-best
equilibrium coincides with the Ramsey outcome. In other words, the Ramsey planner would be able to implement
the rst-best equilibrium.
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devaluing in good times. While such a devaluation does not a¤ect tradersreal money balances
(since they can always replenish their nominal money balances at the central banks window), it
reduces non-tradersreal money balances thus forcing them not to over-consume in good times. In
sum, the key to achieving the rst best is that the monetary authoritys actions hit traders and
non-traders asymmetrically.
Since state-contingent rules are, by their very nature, not easy to implement in practice (as they
would require the monetary authority to respond to contemporaneous shocks), we then proceed to
ask the question: what are the optimal policy rules within the class of non-state contingent rules?
Since in our model shocks are independently and identically distributed, non-state contingent rules
take the form of either a constant money growth rate or a constant rate of devaluation. Our main
nding is that, among non-state contingent rules, money-based rules generally welfare-dominate
exchange rate-based rules. In fact, a xed exchange rate is never optimal in our model, while a
constant money supply rule (i.e., zero money growth) would be optimal if the economy were hit
only by monetary shocks. Intuitively, this reects a fundamental feature of our model: asset market
segmentation critically a¤ects the key adjustment mechanism that operates under predetermined
exchange rates; namely, the exchange of money for bonds (or viceversa) at the central banks
window. Since only a fraction of agents operate in the asset market, this typical mechanism
loses e¤ectiveness in our model. In contrast, the typical adjustment mechanism that operates
under exible rates (adjustments in the exchange rate/price level) is not a¤ected by asset market
segmentation. We thus conclude that our model would rationalize monetary regimes where the
exchange rate is allowed to (at least partly) respond to various shocks.
An important assumption of the model is that non-traders do not have any nancial instruments
with which to save (since they only hold nominal money balances and the cash-in-advance constraint
binds). While this may be an innocuous assumption for small shocks, it is probably not so for large
shocks. To make sure that our results do not critically depend on this assumption, we study in an
appendix the case in which non-traders have access to a non-state contingent bond and show that,
qualitatively, the same results mentioned above hold.
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The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model and the equilibrium conditions
while Section 3 describes the allocations under alternative exchange rate regimes and compares
welfare under the di¤erent regimes. Section 4 studies the implications of the di¤erent monetary
regimes for macroeconomic volatility. Finally, Section 5 concludes. An appendix studies the case
in which non-traders have access to a non-contingent bond. Algebraically tedious proofs are also
consigned to appendices.
2 Model
The basic model is an open economy variant of the model outlined in Alvarez, Lucas, and Weber
(2001). Consider a small open economy perfectly integrated with world goods markets. There is
a unit measure of households who consume an internationally-traded good. The world currency
price of the consumption good is xed at one. The households face a cash-in-advance constraint.
As is standard in these models, households are prohibited from consuming their own endowment.
We assume that a household consists of a seller-shopper pair. While the seller sells the households
own endowment, the shopper goes out with money to purchase consumption goods from other
households.
There are two potential sources of uncertainty in the economy. First, each household receives
a random endowment yt of the consumption good in each period. We assume that yt is an in-
dependently and identically distributed random variable with mean y and variance 2y.
3 Second,
following Alvarez et al, we assume that the shopper can access a proportion vt of the households
current period (t) sales receipts, in addition to the cash carried over from the last period (Mt), to
purchase consumption. We assume that vt is an independently and identically distributed random
variable with mean v 2 [0; 1] and variance 2v. Only a fraction  of the population, called traders,
has access to (complete) asset markets, where 0    1.4 The rest, 1  , called non-traders, can
3We could allow for di¤erent means and variances for the endowments of traders and non-traders without changing
our basic results.
4As will become clear below, the assumption of complete markets for traders greatly simplies the problem. In
Lahiri, Singh, and Vegh (2003), we also solve the case of incomplete markets for some particular policy rules (i.e.,
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only hold domestic money as an asset. In the following we shall refer to these v shocks as velocity
shocks.5
In each period t, the economy experiences one of the nitely many events xt = fvt; ytg : Denote
by xt = (x0; x1; x2:::::::; xt) the history of events up to and including period t: The probability,
as of period 0, of any particular history xt is 
 
xt

= 
 
xtjxt 1  xt 1 : The households
intertemporal utility function is
W0 =
1X
t=0
X
xt
t
 
xt

u(c
 
xt

); (1)
where  is the householdstime discount factor, and c
 
xt

is consumption in period t.
The timing runs as follows. First, both the endowment and velocity shocks are realized at
the beginning of every period. Second, the household splits. Sellers of both households stay at
home and sell their endowment for local currency. Shoppers of the non-trading households are
excluded from the asset market and, hence, go directly to the goods market with their overnight
cash to buy consumption goods. Shoppers of trading households rst carry the cash held overnight
to the asset market where they trade in bonds and receive any money injections for the period.
They then proceed to the goods market with whatever money balances are left after their portfolio
rebalancing. After acquiring goods in exchange for cash, the non-trading-shopper returns straight
home while the trading-shopper can re-enter the asset market to exchange goods for foreign bonds.
After all trades for the day are completed and markets close, the shopper and the seller are reunited
at home.
constant money supply and constant exchange rate) and show that similar results obtain.
5There are alternative ways in which one can think about these velocity shocks. Following Alvarez, Lucas, and
Weber (2001) one can think of the shopper as visiting the sellers store at some time during the trading day, emptying
the cash register, and returning to shop some more. The uncertainty regarding v can be thought of as the uncertainty
regarding the total volume of sales at the time that the shopper accesses the cash register. Alternatively, one can
think of this as representing an environment where the shopper can purchase goods either through cash or credit.
However, the mix of cash and credit transactions is uncertain and uctuates across periods.
6
2.1 Householdsproblem
2.1.1 Traders
Traders have access to world capital markets in which they can trade state contingent securities
spanning all states. The traders begin any period with assets in the form of money balances and
state-contingent bonds carried over from the previous period. Armed with these assets the shopper
of the trader household visits the asset market where she rebalances the households asset position
and also receives the lump sum asset market transfers from the government. For any period t  0,
the accounting identity for the asset market transactions of a trader household is given by
M^T
 
xt

= MT
 
xt 1

+ S
 
xt

f
 
xt
  S  xtX
xt+1
q
 
xt+1 jxt f  xt+1+ T  xt

; (2)
where M^T (xt) denotes the money balances with which the trader leaves the asset market under
history xt (which includes the time t state xt) while MT (xt 1) denotes the money balances with
which the trader entered the asset market.6 S(xt) is the exchange rate (the domestic currency
price of foreign currency). f
 
xt+1

denotes units of state-contingent securities, in terms of tradable
goods, bought in period t at a per unit price of q
 
xt+1 jxt : A trader receives payment of f  xt+1
in period t+1 if and only if the history xt+1 occurs. T are aggregate (nominal) lump-sum transfers
from the government.7 ;8
After asset markets close, the shopper proceeds to the goods market with M^T in nominal money
balances to purchase consumption goods. The cash-in-advance constraint for traders is thus given
6Note that the money balances with which a trader enters the asset market at time t reects the history of
realizations till time t  1. Hence, beginning of period money balances at time t depend on the history xt 1.
7We assume that these transfers are made in the asset markets, where only the traders are present. Note that
since T denotes aggegate transfers, the corresponding per trader value is T= since traders comprise a fraction  of
the population.
8The assumption of endogenous lump-sum transfers will ensure that any monetary policy may be consistent with
the intertemporal scal constraint. This becomes particularly important in this stochastic environment where these
endogenous transfers will have to adjust to ensure intertemporal solvency for any history of shocks. To make our
life easier, these transfers are assumed to go only to traders. If these transfers also went to non-traders, then (12)
would be a¤ected.
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by 9
S
 
xt

cT
 
xt

= M^T
 
xt

+ vtS
 
xt

yt: (3)
Equation (3) shows that for consumption purposes, traders can augment the beginning of period
cash balances by withdrawals from current period sales receipts vt (the velocity shocks). Note that
purchasing power parity implies that S(xt) also denotes the domestic currency price of consumption
goods under history xt. Lastly, period-t sales receipts net of withdrawals become beginning of next
periods money balances
MT
 
xt

= S
 
xt

yt(1  vt): (4)
Combining equations (2) and (3) yields
MT
 
xt 1

+
T
 
xt


+ vtS
 
xt

yt =S
 
xt

cT
 
xt
  S  xt f  xt (5)
+S
 
xt
X
xt+1
q
 
xt+1 jxt f  xt+1 :
We assume thatMT0 = M . We assume that actuarially fair securities are available in international
asset markets. By denition, actuarially fair securities imply that
q
 
xt+1i jxt

q

xt+1j jxt
 =   xt+1i jxt


xt+1j jxt
 ; (6)
for any pair of securities i and j belonging to the set x. Further, no-arbitrage implies that the
price of a riskless security that promises to pay one unit next period should equal the price of a
complete set of state-contingent securities (which would lead to the same outcome):
1
1 + r
=
X
xt+1
q
 
xt+1 jxt : (7)
Using (6) repeatedly to solve for a particular security relative to all others and substituting into
(7), we obtain:
9Throughout the analysis we shall restrict attention to ranges in which the cash-in-advance constraint binds for
both traders and non-traders. In general, this would entail checking the individual optimality conditions to infer the
parameter restrictions for which the cash-in-advance constraints bind (see Lahiri, Singh, and Vegh (2006)).
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q
 
xt+1 jxt =   xt+1jxt ; (8)
where we have assumed that  = 1=(1 + r). Note further that the availability of these sequential
securities is equivalent to the availability of Arrow-Debreu securities, where all markets open only
on date 0: Hence, by the same logic, it must be true for Arrow-Debreu security prices that
q
 
xt

= t
 
xt

: (9)
The traders arrive in this economy at time 0 with initial nominal money balances M and initial
net foreign asset holdings of f0. To ensure market completeness, we allow for asset market trade
right before period 0 shocks are realized, so that traders can exchange f0 for state-contingent claims
payable after the realization of shocks in period 0. Formally,
f0 =
X
x0
q (x0) f (x0) ; (10)
where q (x0) =  (x0) :
Maximizing (1) subject to (5) yields
q
 
xt+1 jxt =   xt+1jxt u0  c  xt+1
u0 (c (xt))
: (11)
Equation (11) is the standard Euler equation for the trader which relates the expected marginal rate
of consumption substitution between today and tomorrow to the return on savings discounted to
today. Since  = 11+r ; it is clear from (8) and (11) that traders choose a at path for consumption.
2.1.2 Non-traders
As stated earlier, the non-traders in this economy do not have access to asset markets.10 They are
born with some initial nominal money balances M and then transit between periods by exchanging
10 In the appendix we analyze the case in which non-traders have access to a non-state contingent bond and show
that, qualitatively, results are the same. Qualitatively, then, our results only depend on di¤erential access to asset
instruments between traders and non-traders. Quantitatively, however, results will be sensitive to how close the
nancial instruments that non-traders hold are to a full set of state contingent claims.
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cash for goods and vice-versa.11 The non-traders cash-in-advance constraint is given by:
S(xt)cNT (xt) = MNT (xt 1) + vtS(xt)yt; (12)
where MNT (xt 1) is the beginning of period t nominal money balances (which is dependent on the
history xt 1) for non-traders. Their initial period cash-in-advance constraint is
S(x0)cNT (x0) = M + v0S(x
0)y0:
Like traders, the non-traders can also augment their beginning of period cash balances by with-
drawals from current period sales receipts vt (the velocity shocks). Money balances at the beginning
of period t+ 1 are given by sales receipts net of withdrawals for period t consumption:
MNT (xt) = S(xt)yt(1  vt): (13)
2.2 Government
The government in this economy holds foreign bonds (reserves) which earn the world rate of interest
r. The government can sell nominal domestic bonds, issue domestic money, and make lump sum
transfers to the traders. Thus, the governments budget constraint is given by
S(xt)
X
xt+1
q
 
xt+1 jxth  xt+1  S(xt)h(xt) + T (xt) = M(xt) M(xt 1); (14)
where h are foreign bonds held by the government, M is the aggregate money supply, and T is
government transfers to the traders. It is crucial to note that changes in money supply impact
only the traders since they are the only agents present in the asset market.
2.3 Equilibrium conditions
Equilibrium in the money market requires that
M(xt) = MT (xt) + (1  )MNT (xt): (15)
11Note that we have assumed that the initial holdings of nominal money balances is invariant across the two types
of agents, i.e., MT0 = M
NT
0 = M .
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The ow constraint for the economy as a whole (i.e., the current account) follows from combining the
constraints for non-traders (equations (12) and (13)), traders (equation (5)), and the government
(equation (14)) and money market equilibrium (equation (15)):
cT (xt) + (1  )cNT (xt) = yt + k(xt) 
X
xt+1
q
 
xt+1 jxt k  xt+1 ; (16)
where k  h+ f denotes per-capita foreign bonds for the economy as a whole.
To obtain the quantity theory, combine (3), (13) and (15) to get:
M(xt)
1  vt = S(x
t)yt: (17)
Notice that the stock of money relevant for the quantity theory is end of period t money balances
M(xt). This reects the fact that, unlike standard CIA models (in which the goods market is open
before the asset market and shoppers cannot withdraw current sales receipts for consumption), in
this model (i) asset markets open before goods market open (which allows traders to use period t
money injections for consumption purposes in that period); and (ii) both traders and non-traders
can access current sales receipts.
Combining (12) and (13) gives the consumption of non-traders:
cNT (xt) =
S(xt 1)
S(xt)
(1  vt 1)yt 1 + vtyt; (18)
cNT (x0) =
M
S(x0)
+ v0y0: (19)
To obtain the level of constant consumption for traders, we use equation (4) to substitute for MTt
in equation (5). Then, subtracting S(xt)yt from both sides allows us to rewrite (5) as
f(xt) 
X
xt+1
q
 
xt+1 jxt f(xt+1) + yt   cT (xt) = M(xt) M(xt 1)
S(xt)
  T
 
xt


;
where we have used equation (17) to get
M(xt) M(xt 1) = S(xt)yt   S(xt 1)yt 1  
 
vtS(x
t)yt   vt 1S(xt 1)yt 1

:
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Using equation (14) in the equation above givesX
xt+1
q
 
xt+1 jxt h  xt+1

+ f
 
xt+1
!  f  xt  h  xt

= yt   cT
 
xt

+

1  

 
M
 
xt
 M  xt 1
S (xt)
!
; (20)
where h0 and f0 are given exogenously. Using (9) and iterating forward on equation (20), it can
be checked that under either regime and for any type of shock (i.e., velocity or output shock),
consumption of traders is given by:12
cT
 
xt

= r
k0

+ y + r
X
xt
t
 
xt
1  

 
M
 
xt
 M  xt 1
S (xt)
!
; t  0; (21)
where k0 = h0 + f0. In the following, we shall maintain the assumption that initial net country
assets are zero, i.e., k0 = 0.
3 Alternative monetary regimes
Having described the model and the equilibrium conditions above, we now turn to allocations
under specic monetary policy regimes. We will look at four regimes: (i) the state contingent
money growth rule which implements the rst-best; (ii) the state contingent devaluation rate rule
which also implements the rst-best; (iii) the best non-state contingent money growth rule which
maximizes joint welfare of both types of agents; and (iv) the best non-state contingent exchange
rate rule which maximizes the joint welfare of both agents. The reason we are interested in studying
simple, non-state contingent rules is because they are often easier to implement as well as being
easier to monitor. The end goal, of course, is to evaluate both the welfare implications under these
four regimes as well as the implied macroeconomic volatility under them. Of particular interest is
an evaluation of the welfare losses that are implied by following simple non-state contingent rules
relative to the rst-best state contingent rule.13
12This is accomplished by multiplying each periods ow constraint by q
 
xt

and summing it over all possible
realizations. Then, summing it over all periods and imposing tranversality conditions gives the intertemporal budget
constraint.
13An extensive literature on the time consistency of monetary policy going back to Aurenheimer (1974) has docu-
mented the advantages of rules over discretion in conducting monetary policy due to commitment problems on the
12
Before proceeding we need to tie down the initial period price level, S0. From the quantity
theory equation we know that S0 = M1(1 v0)y0 . In order to keep initial period allocations symmetric
across regimes we make the neutral assumption that M1 = M . Hence,
S0 =
M
(1  v0)y0 : (22)
Noting that S0 = S(x0), it is easy to check from equation (19) that this assumption implies that
cNT0 = y0: (23)
In order to make progress analytically, we shall now specialize the utility function to the
quadratic form. Thus, we assume from hereon that the periodic utility of the household of ei-
ther type is given by:
u(c) = c  c2: (24)
Note that the quadratic utility specication implies that the expected value of periodic utility can
be written as
E
 
c  c2 = E(c)   [E(c)]2   V ar(c): (25)
where V ar(c) denotes the variance of consumption.
We shall conduct the welfare analysis by comparing the expectation of lifetime welfare at time
t = 0 conditional on period 0 realizations (but before the revelation of any information at time 1).
Specically, the expected welfare under any monetary regime is calculated given the initial period
shocks x0, the initial price level S0 =
M
(1 v0)y0 as well as the associated initial money injection for
period 1: M(x0) = M1 = M . In terms of preliminaries, it is useful to dene the following:
W i;j =E
X
t

ci;jt   

ci;jt
2
; i = T;NT ; j = monetary regime; (26)
W j = W T;j + (1  )WNT;j ; j = monetary regime: (27)
Equation (26) gives the welfare for each agent under a specic monetary policy regime where the
relevant consumption for each type of agent is given by the consumption functions relevant for that
part of the monetary authority.
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regime. Equation (27) is the aggregate welfare for the economy under each regime. It is the sum
of the regime specic welfares of the two types of households weighted by their population shares.
3.1 First-best state contingent money growth rule
We have shown above that when traders have access to complete markets, they can fully insure
against all shocks. Hence, the only role for policy is to smooth the consumption of non-traders
who do not have access to asset markets. Clearly, the rst-best outcome for the non-traders would
be a at consumption path (recall that all the welfare losses for non-traders in this model come
from consumption volatility).14
Recall from equation (18) that consumption of non-traders is given by
cNT (xt) =
S(xt 1)
S(xt)
(1  vt 1)yt 1 + vtyt: (28)
Using the quantity theory equation S(xt)yt(1  vt) = M(xt) in the above and rearranging gives
cNT (xt) = yt  

M(xt) M(xt 1)
S(xt)

:
Substituting out for S(xt) from the quantity theory relationship then yields
cNT (xt) = yt

1 

M(xt) M(xt 1)
M(xt)

(1  vt)

: (29)
As was assumed earlier, the endowment sequence follows an i.i.d. process with mean y and
variance 2y. It is clear that the rst-best outcome for non-traders would be achieved if c
NT
t = y
for all t. The key question that we focus on here is whether or not there exists a monetary policy
rule which can implement this allocation.
Let (xt) be the growth rate of money given history xt.15 Hence,
M(xt) M(xt 1) = (xt)M(xt 1); t  1
14The conclusion that the only role for policy is to smooth the consumption of non-traders is crucially dependent
on the assumptions that the endowment process is the same for both types with the same mean, and that initial net
country assets are zero. If this were not the case, then an additional goal for policy would be to shift consumption
across types in order to equalize them.
15Recall that M1 = M implies that (x0) = 0 by assumption.
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Substituting this into equation (29) gives
cNT (xt) = yt

1 

(xt)
1 + (xt)

(1  vt)

:
To check if monetary policy can implement the rst-best, we substitute cNT (xt) = y in the above
to get
y
yt
=

1 

(xt)
1 + (xt)

(1  vt)

:
This expression can be solved for (xt) as a function of yt and vt. Thus,
(xt) =
yt   y
y   vtyt : (30)
A few features of this policy rule are noteworthy.16 First, as long as the monetary authority
chooses  after observing the realizations for y and v, this rule is implementable. Second, equation
(30) makes clear that when there are no shocks to output, i.e., yt = y for all t, the optimal policy
is to choose t = 0 for all t independent of the velocity shock. Hence, under velocity shocks only,
a exible exchange rate regime with a constant money supply implements the rst-best allocation.
A third interesting feature of equation (30) is that the optimal monetary policy is procyclical.
In particular, it is easy to check that
@(x
t)
@yt
=
y(1  vt)
(y   vtyt)2 > 0: (31)
Note that the latter inequality in (31) follows from the fact that v is strictly bounded above
by one. The intuition for this result is that, ceteris paribus, an increase in output raises non-
tradersconsumption through two channels. First, current sales revenue is higher, which implies
that there is more cash available for consumption. Second, an increase in output appreciates the
currency thereby raising the real value of money balances brought into the period. To counteract
these expansionary e¤ects on non-tradersconsumption, the optimal monetary policy calls for an
16Notice that since there is no distortionary taxation in our model and in the absence of net initial assets the
rst-best coincides with the Ramsey plan. In other words, the Ramsey problem would also yield the above policy
rule which replicates the rst-best.
15
expansion in money growth. An expansion in money growth reduces non-traders consumption
by redistributing resources from non-traders to traders. More specically, since only traders are
present in the asset markets, they get a more than proportionate amount of money while the
exchange rate (price level) rises in proportion to the money injection. Hence, tradersreal money
balances increase, which they can use to buy goods from non-traders and exchange for foreign
bonds. In bad times, a money withdrawal from the system leaves traders with lower real money
balances, which leads them to sell those goods to non-traders. In other words, policymakers are
smoothing non-traders consumption by engineering a transfer of resources from non-traders to
traders in good times and viceversa in bad times.
Fourth, the optimal policy response to velocity shocks depends on the level of output relative
to its mean level. In particular,
@(x
t)
@vt
=
yt(yt   y)
(y   vtyt)2 R 0:
Thus, when output is above the mean level, an increase in v calls for an increase in money
growth while if output is below the mean then the opposite is true. Intuitively, an increase in vt
has two opposing e¤ects on real balances available for consumption. First, it raises real balances
since it implies that a higher proportion of current sales can be used in the current period. Second,
a higher vt depreciates the currency thereby deceasing the real value of money balances brought
into the period. When output is equal to the mean level, absent a change in policy, these e¤ects
exactly o¤set each other. On the other hand, when output is above (below) the mean, the current
sales e¤ect is stronger (weaker) than the exchange rate e¤ect. Hence, an increase (decrease) in 
provides the appropriate correction through the redistribution channel spelled out above.
3.2 First-best state contingent devaluation rate rule
To derive the rst-best state contingent devaluation rate rule, substitute cNTt = y into equation
(28) and replace S(x
t 1)
S(xt) by
1
1+"(xt) to obtain:
"
 
xt

=
(1  vt 1) yt 1
y   vtyt   1: (32)
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Again, several features of this rule are noteworthy. First and as was the case for the money growth
rule just discussed as long as the monetary authority can observe contemporaneous realizations of
y and v, this rule is implementable. Second and unlike the money growth rule just discussed this
rule also depends on past values of output. Intuitively, the reason is that under a peg, non-traders
consumption depends on last periods consumption, as follows from (28). Third, if there are no
shocks to either output or velocity (i.e., if yt = y and vt = v for all t), then the optimal policy is to
keep the exchange rate at (i.e., " = 0).
Fourth, this rule is procyclical with respect to output in the sense that, all else equal, a higher re-
alization of todays output calls for an increase in the rate of devaluation. Intuitively, an increase in
todays output increases todays non-tradersconsumption because current sales revenue is higher,
which implies that there is more cash available for consumption. To keep non-tradersconsumption
at over time, the monetary authority needs to o¤set this e¤ect. The way to do so is to increase
todays exchange rate (i.e., a nominal devaluation). A nominal devaluation will tend to lower real
money balances of both traders and non-traders. Traders, however, can easily undo this by re-
plenishing their nominal money balances at the central banks window (as in the standard model).
Non-traders, however, have no way of doing this and hence see their consumption lowered by the
fact that they have lower real money balances. In bad times (low realization of output), a revalu-
ation will have the opposite e¤ect. In sum, the monetary authority is able to smooth non-traders
consumption through real balances e¤ect.
Fifth, a high realization of todays velocity shock also calls for an increase in the rate of devalu-
ation. Intuitively, a high value of v implies that both traders and non-traders have a higher level of
real cash balances for consumption. Traders, of course, can undo this in the asset markets. Non-
traders, however, cannot do this and would be forced to consume too much today. By devaluing,
the monetary authority decreases the value of non-tradersreal money balances. Conversely, a low
value of v would be counteracted by a nominal revaluation.
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3.3 Non-state contingent money growth rule
The rst non-state contingent rule that we analyze is a time invariant money growth rule. The main
exercise is to determine the constant money growth rule which maximizes the joint, share-weighted
lifetime welfare of the two types of agents in the economy. Hence, the objective is to choose  to
maximize
W = W T;  + (1  )WNT; :
In order to compute the optimal constant non-state contingent money growth rule, we rst need
to determine the consumption allocations for the two agents under this regime (for an arbitrary
but constant money growth rate). As before we use  to denote the rate of money growth. Given
a utility specication,  can be computed by maximizing weighted utilities.
Under the time invariant money growth rule and the quantity theory equation Styt(1   vt) =
Mt+1, equations (18) and (21) imply that consumption of nontraders and traders are given by
cNTt = z (1  vt) yt + vtyt; t  1; (33)
cTt = r
k0

+ y

1 +

1  


(1  z) (1  v)

; (34)
where z  11+

= MtMt+1

. >From here on, we abstract from distributional issues relating to the
distribution of initial wealth across agents, by assuming that initial net country assets are zero,
i.e., k0 = 0. Since E

cT

+ (1  )E cNTt  = y, under our maintained assumption of quadratic
preferences, the optimal z is determined by solving the problem:
min
z
n

 
E
 
cT
2
+ (1  )  E  cNT 2 + (1  )V ar cNT o : (35)
In order to derive the optimal money growth rate we need to know the expected consumption
levels of the two types as well as the unconditional consumption variance for the nontrader. The
expected consumption is trivial to compute and, from (33), it can be shown that the variance of
non-traders consumption is given by:
V ar

cNTt

= z22y + (1  z)2

2y
2
v + y
22v + v
22y

+ 2z (1  z) v2y: (36)
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Substituting in the relevant expressions for cT ; E(cNT ); and V ar

cNT

into (35) and taking
the rst order condition with respect to z yields
z =
2vy   v2y + (1 v)
2
 y
2
2vy + (1  2v)2y + (1 v)
2
 y
2
; (37)
where 2vy  2y2v + y22v + v22y. Since  = 1 zz , the optimal  that is implied by (37) is
~ =
(1  v)2y
2vy +
(1 v)2y2
   v2y
: (38)
Equation (38) makes clear that the higher the value of , the higher will be ~. This is due to the
fact that with a higher share of traders, transferring resources from nontraders in order to minimize
their consumption variances does not create large di¤erences in the consumption levels of the two
types.
We should note two special cases. First, when the economy is open to only output shocks, i.e.,
2v = 0, the optimal rate of money growth implied by equation (38) is
17
~j2v=0 =
1  v
v2 + (1 v)
2y2
2y
  v
:
The optimal ~ is thus an increasing function of the variance of output shocks, 2y. Intuitively,
policymakers nd it optimal to provide insurance to non-traders by reducing their consumption
variability. The price of this insurance (a transfer from non-traders to traders) increases with
the variability of output. (Notice that a positive  implies a transfer from non-traders to traders.)
Second, when there is no output volatility in the economy so that 2y = 0, the optimal constant
money growth rate given by (38) is
~ = 0;
which implies that a policy of xed money supply is optimal. Interestingly, we have seen above
that the state contingent rst-best rule calls for  = 0 when there are no output shocks. Hence,
17Let k0 = 0. Then, a su¢ cient condition to ensure that  > 0 is v < 1
1+
2y
y2
: Even for  = 1, and a relatively
high value of y
y
= 0:1 the above holds if v < 0:99. (Note that a value of 0.99 implies a velocity of 1
1 v = 100; much
higher than empirically observed values.)
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when there is no output volatility in the economy, the non-state contingent optimal money growth
rule coincides with the state contingent rst-best rule. In general, however, a xed money rule
does not achieve the rst best equilibrium.
3.3.1 Welfare loss relative to the rst-best
Under our quadratic preference specication, welfare under the state-contingent rule is
W fb = W T;fb + (1  )WNT;fb = y   y2 (39)
We now compute the welfare loss under the optimal money growth rule relative to the rst best.
Dene the welfare loss under money growth rate ~, relative to the rst-best as18
4W ~ = W fb  W ~:
Observe that the welfare maximizing ~ that is obtained from (35) also minimizes 4W ~. In
the appendix we show that by substituting in the relevant expressions for E
 
cT

; E
 
cNT

and
V ar

cNT

into the welfare loss expression gives
4W ~ =  (1  )
1  
0B@ 1 + (1 v)22v

1 +
2y
y2

1 + 
(1 v)2
2
v

1 +
2y
y2

+ 
2y
y2
1CA2y (40)
If only one shock is present at a time, then (40) simplies to
4W ~ =
8>><>>:
0; only velocity shocks (2y = 0)
(1 )
1 
2y
1+
2y
y2
; only output shocks (2v = 0)
(41)
Equation (41) shows that when there is no output volatility so that 2y = 0, the welfare loss from
following the optimal money growth rule is zero. This reects the fact that under no output shocks
the optimal state contingent rule and the optimal non-state contingent money growth rule coincide.
They both call for a xed money rule.
Equation (41) also shows that when there is no volatility in the velocity process, i.e., 2v = 0, so
that the economy is exposed to only output volatility, the welfare losses from following a non-state
18Superscript ~ denotes variable values under optimal money growth rule.
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contingent money growth rule are increasing in the volatility of output and decreasing in the share
of traders . Both these comparative static e¤ects are intuitive. The higher is 2y the greater is
the loss from not being able to vary the growth rate of money to better accommodate the state of
the economy. On the other hand, the greater is the share of traders in the economy (a higher ),
the closer the economy is to full insurance since the traders can completely insure against all risk.
Hence, the smaller are the welfare losses relative to the rst-best under the xed money growth
rule.
A special case of the constant money growth rule is the xed money supply rule, i.e.,  = 0.
Hence, money supply is set to M for all t. In this case the welfare loss relative to the rst-best is:
4W M =  (1  )
1   
2
y
Thus,
4W M
4W ~ = 1 + 
2y
y2
 1:
This expression shows that only in the special case of no output volatility (2y = 0), do we have
4W M = 4W ~ = 0. In general, a xed money policy generates welfare losses which are at least
as great as those under an optimally chosen constant money growth rule.
3.4 Optimal rate of devaluation
We now turn to our second non-state contingent rule which is a xed rate of devaluation. This rule
is of interest for two reasons. First, a number of developing countries use the exchange rate as a
nominal anchor and thereby prefer some sort of exchange rate rule. Second, an exchange rate rule
corresponds closely to an ination targeting policy in this one good world of our model. Needless
to say ination targeting is a policy which is both widely used and discussed in policy circles.
Dene z  11+"

= St 1St

. As before the optimal z or, equivalently, the rate of devaluation "
is determined by solving (35). Under a constant devaluation rate, equations (18), (23) and (21)
imply that consumption of nontraders and traders are given by
cNTt = z (1  vt 1) yt 1 + vtyt; t  1;
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cTt = y

1 +

1  


(1  z) (1  v)

:
Hence,
V ar

cNTt

= z22y +
 
1 + z2

2vy   2z2v2y: (42)
Given that E
 
cT

+ (1  )E  cNT  = y, it is still the case that the optimal z (and hence,
the optimal rate of devaluation ") can be derived from the solution to
arg min
z
n

 
E
 
cT
2
+ (1  )  E  cNT 2 + (1  )V ar cNTt o :
The implied optimal rate of devaluation "^ is given by
1  z^
z^
= ~" = 
"
2v
(1  v)2
 
1 +
2y
y2
!
+
2y
y2
#
: (43)
Hence, the optimal rate of devaluation is increasing in the variance of both shocks.
There are two special cases which are worth emphasizing. First, when the economy faces no
output uncertainty so that the only uncertainty is regarding the velocity realization, i.e., 2y = 0,
the optimal rate of devaluation implied by equation (43) is
~" =
2v
(1  v)2 :
Second, when the only uncertainty is about the output realization, i.e., 2v = 0, the optimal deval-
uation rate is
~" =
2y
y2
:
It is worth pointing out that equation (43) clearly shows that, in general, it is never optimal to set
" = 0, i.e., xed exchange rates are never optimal. Only in the uninteresting case of no shocks at
all in the economy (2v = 
2
y = 0) is it optimal to peg the exchange rate.
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19 It would appear from these expressions that a xed exchange rate is optimal when there are no traders in the
economy, i.e., when  = 0. However, this conclusion is not valid since the model is discontinuous at  = 0. In
particular, when there are no traders at all, there is no way for the monetary authority to introduce money into the
economy since all money injections, by assumption, are in the asset market. Hence, maintaining a xed exchange
rate by appropriate changes in money supply is not feasible.
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3.4.1 Welfare loss relative to the rst-best
We next turn to the welfare loss relative to the rst best that is implied by following the devaluation
rule. The welfare loss expression is 4W ~" = W fb  W ~". Substituting the relevant expressions
for trader and nontrader consumption, the nontrader variance, and the optimal devaluation rate
policy (43) into 4W ~" gives
4W ~" =  (1  )
1  
0BBB@
v2

1 + 
2
v
v2

1 + y
2
2y

+
(1  v)2

1+
2v
(1 v)2

1+ y
2
2y

1+


(1 v)2 
2
v

1+
2y
y2

+
2y
y2

1CCCA2y: (44)
If only one shock is present at a time, then (44) simplies to
4W ~" =
8>>>><>>>>:
(1 )
1  y
2
 
1 + 1
1+
2v
(1 v)2
!
2v; only velocity shocks (
2
y = 0),
(1 )
1  v
2
 
1 +
( 1 vv )
2
1+
2y
y2
!
2y; only output shocks (
2
v = 0).
(45)
A special case of the xed devaluation rate policy is the policy of a xed exchange rate, i.e.,
" = 0. In this case the welfare loss relative to the rst-best is given by
4W S =  (1  )
1  

(1  v)2 + v2 + 22v

1 +
y2
2y

2y: (46)
If only one shock is present at a time, then (46) simplies to
4W S =
8><>:
(1 )
1  2
2
vy
2; only velocity shocks (2y = 0),
(1 )
1 

(1  v)2 + v2

2y; only output shocks (
2
v = 0).
(47)
3.5 Welfare comparison
It is clear that  = 0 will always be dominated by an optimal  since the optimal  is not constrained
to be non-zero. Similarly the xed exchange rate, i.e., " = 0 will be always be dominated by ~". The
question regarding which of these two non-state contingent rules is better from a welfare standpoint
still remains to be answered. To address this question it is useful to derive an expression for 4W
~"
4W ~ .
Note that 4W
~"
4W ~ < 1 implies that a xed devaluation rate rule will dominate a xed money growth
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rule. The opposite holds when 4W
~"
4W ~ > 1. Using equations (40) and (44) it can be shown that
4W ~"
4W ~ 7 1 i¤0BBB@
v2

1 + 
2
v
v2

1 + y
2
2y

+
(1  v)2

1+
2v
(1 v)2

1+ y
2
2y

1+

2v
(1 v)2

1+
2y
y2

+
2y
y2

1CCCA7 1 +

(1 v)2
2
v

1 +
2y
y2

1 + 
(1 v)2
2
v

1 +
2y
y2

+ 
2y
y2
(48)
While both sides of equation (48) are increasing (decreasing) in velocity (output) shocks, the LHS
increases faster than the RHS when 2v rises. Hence, ~ will dominate ~" when velocity shocks
are relatively dominant. On the other hand, the LHS decreases faster than the RHS when 2y
increases. Hence, the desirability of a optimal " policy will increase with higher output variance.
In the limiting case, when only output shocks are present,
4W ~"
4W ~ 7 1 if and only if v
2 +
(1  v)2
1 + 
2y
y2
7 1
1 + 
2y
y2
Hence, an ~" policy would welfare dominate an ~ policy if and only if
v 2
0@0; 1
1 + 2
2y
y2
1A : (49)
Figure 1 shows precisely this trade-o¤ through a simulation of the model. It depicts the ratio
of the welfare loss (relative to the rst best) under optimal  to the welfare loss under optimal
". Hence, a value lower than one means that optimal  delivers higher welfare than optimal ".
The parameters assumed for the simulation are: y = 1; v = 0:2;  = 0:5;  = 0:97;  = 0:15.20
For a given v,
4W ~
4W ~" rises with y. Hence, the relative attraction of the xed devaluation rate
policy rises with the volatility of output. The gure also shows that for a given y,
4W ~
4W ~" falls
(the schedule shifts down) as v rises. Hence, the money growth rule becomes more attractive
as the relative volatility of velocity increases. To summarize, the model predicts that exchange
20We should note that the attempt here is not replicate a specic economy but rather, to determine the qualitative
nature of the relationship between the volatility of shocks and the optimal monetary policy regime. We defer till
later a discussion about the implications of the model for specic economies.
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rate targeting rules begin to welfare dominate money growth rules when output shocks become
relatively more important while the opposite is true when velocity shocks are relatively dominant.
Figure 1
Since Figure 1 indicates that the welfare comparison depends on both output and velocity
volatility, it is useful to focus on some actual numbers for illustration purposes. The following table
shows output and velocity volatilities (in percentages) for Argentina, Brazil, and, as a benchmark,
the United States. We see that, even in highly volatile countries such as Argentina and Brazil,
output volatility is less than 5 percent. It is thus clear from Figure 1 that, given the gures
presented in the table, all three countries would be better o¤ with a money growth rule (that
allows for exchange rate exibility) than with a devaluation rule.
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Country
Output volatility
(% std. dev.)
Velocity volatility (M2)
(of quarter-to-quarter
% changes )
Argentina 4.5 9.9
Brazil 4.5 8.1
United States 2.05 1.2
Table 1: output and veolcity variabilities
These estimates are based on annualized quarterly data for M2 and nominal GDP; for Argentina: 1993Q1 - 2003Q2;
Brazil: 1994Q3 - 2003Q2; US: 1970Q1 - 2003Q2; Source : International Financial Statistics.
For the countries reported in Table 1 the welfare tradeo¤ between ~ and ~" policies are shown
below in Figure 2
Figure 2
The calulcations assume v = 0:82, 0:09, and 0:45, and v = 0:05; 0:07; and 0:04 for Argentina, Brazil, and US
respectively. These estimates are based on annualized quarterly data for M2 and nominal GDP; for Argentina :
1993Q1 - 2003Q2; Brazil: 1994Q3 - 2003Q2; US: 1970Q1 - 2003Q2; Source : International Financial Statistics.
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4 Macroeconomic Volatility
Another issue of interest is the volatility of di¤erent macroeconomic variables that is implied by
these alternative monetary regimes. This is of interest both from a policy perspective as well
as from the perspective of providing us with some testable implications of the structure. There
are three key endogenous macroeconomic variables in the model: consumption, money and the
exchange rate (or equivalently, the price level). We look at each of these in turn.
4.1 Consumption variances
It can be veried from equations (36) and (42) that the variances of consumption for nontraders
under both ~ as well as ~" are increasing in the variances of output and velocity shocks. However,
while consumption variability under ~" grows without bounds, under ~ it stays within bounds. On
the other hand, the ratio of the consumption variance under ~" to that under ~ decreases with the
variance of output. The consumption variance for nontraders under ~" is lower than under ~ if and
only if
v 2
0B@0; 1
1 + 
2y
y2
+ 
2
2

2y
y2
2
1CA : (50)
Although this condition resembles equation (49) which was the relevant condition for comparing
welfares, the range under (50) is narrower than in (49). As a result, even though the consumption
variance may be higher under ~" in the range v 2
0@ 1
1+
2y
y2
+
2
2

2y
y2
2 ; 1
1+
2
2y
y2
1A, ~" is still preferred to
~. This is because ~ induces a smaller variance at the cost of a larger transfer of consumption to
the traders.
4.2 Exchange rate volatilities
A second variable of interest is the volatility of the exchange rate. To get a sense of the implications
of di¤erent monetary regimes for this volatility, we compare the unconditional variances for the
rate of currency depreciation under (1) state-contingent money growth rule, and (2) a xed money
growth rule.
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4.2.1 State-contingent rule
Recall that the optimal state contingent money growth rule is given by t =
yt y
y vtyt . Substituting
this rule into the quantity theory relationship and rearranging the result gives
St =
Mt
y   vtyt
Since "t =
St St 1
St 1 , one can use the exchange rate equation derived above to get
1 + "t =
St
St 1
=
(1  vt 1) yt 1
y   vtyt
Taking a second order expansion of this expression around v and y and then taking expectations
yields
E f"tg u
2vy
y2 (1  v)2 (51)
Similarly, a second order approximation for the variance gives
V ar f"tg u 1
y2 (1  v)2
0@2vy +  2vy + (1  2v)2y
0@ 2vy
y2 (1  v)2 +
 
1 +
2vy
y2 (1  v)2
!21A1A (52)
4.2.2 Fixed money growth rule
Under a xed money growth rate , the quantity theory relationship implies that the exchange rate
is
St =
(1 + )Mt
(1  vt) yt
Hence, the rate of depreciation is given by
1 + "t =
St
St 1
= (1 + )
(1  vt 1) yt 1
(1  vt) yt
Taking a second order approximation of this equation around v and y and then taking expectations
yields
E f"tg u + (1 + )
 
2vy + (1  2v)2y
y2 (1  v)2
!
Correspondingly, a second order approximation for the variance gives
V ar f"tg u (1 + )2
 
2vy + (1  2v)2y

y2 (1  v)2
0B@1 +  2vy + (1  2v)2y
0B@ 1y2(1 v)2
+

1 +
2vy+(1 2v)2y
y2(1 v)2
2
1CA
1CA
(53)
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4.2.3 Comparison
Under an optimal xed money growth rate, ~ > 0: Hence, from (52) and (53), a su¢ cient condition
for the variance of the depreciation rate under the optimal xed money growth rule to be larger
than that under state-contingent rule is v < 0:5: If this condition holds, then
V art 1 f"tg~ > V art 1 f"tgsc > V art 1 f"tg~" = 0
4.3 Interest rate volatility and its cyclical response
Next, we discuss the response of nominal interest rate to output and velocity shocks, rst under
the rst-best rule, and then under xed money growth rule.
4.3.1 State-contingent rule
The nominal interest rate is given by the Euler equation (assuming that there is a riskless govern-
ment bond in the market)
u0(cTt )
St
=  (1 + it)Et
(
u0(cTt+1)
St+1
)
(54)
Under market completeness cTt = c
T for all t. Using (??), nominal interest rate is derived as
(1 + it) = (1 + r)

Et

y   vt+1yt+1
yt (1  vt)
 1
which under our assumption of i.i.d. shocks becomes
1 + it = (1 + r)
yt
y
1  vt
1  v (55)
Notice that the unconditional expectation of 1 + it equals 1 + r. Thus, in terms of % deviation:
2i
(1 + r)2
=
2y
y2
+
2v
(1  v)2 +
2y
y2
2v
(1  v)2
It directly follows from (55) that Corr (i; y) = 1 and Corr (i; v) =  1.
4.3.2 Money growth rule
Under a xed  = , the exchange rate evolves as
St
St+1
=
1
1 + 
yt+1 (1  vt+1)
yt (1  vt) (56)
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Then using (54):
1 + it = (1 + r) (1 + )
yt
y
1  vt
1  v (57)
Notice that E (1 + it) = (1 + r) (1 + ). Thus the volatility (in % terms) is identical under the
rst-best and xed money growth rules.
2i
(1 + r)2 (1 + )2
=
2y
y2
+
2v
(1  v)2 +
2y
y2
2v
(1  v)2
Similarly, it directly follows from (57) that Corr (i; y) = 1 and Corr (i; v) =  1.
Based on the output and velocity volatilities reported in Table 1, the nominal interest rate and
exchange rate volatilities, as implied by the model, are easily computed as:
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Country i (%) " under rst-best " under ~
United States 8.2 11.7 8.3
Argentina 28.2 47.8 29.3
Brazil 8.9 11.9 9.0
Table 2: Interest rate and exchange rate volatilities expressed as % of their mean values.
The calulcations assume v = 0:82, 0:09, and 0:45, and v = 0:05; 0:07; and 0:04 for Argentina, Brazil, and US
respectively. These estimates are based on annualized quarterly data for M2 and nominal GDP; for Argentina :
1993Q1 - 2003Q2; Brazil: 1994Q3 - 2003Q2; US: 1970Q1 - 2003Q2; Source : International Financial Statistics.
We thus observe that the nominal exchange rate volatility is higher under the rst-best optimal
monetary policy than under the xed- rule. Intuitively, this reects the fact that changes in the
price level (i.e., the nominal exchange rate) constitute an essential adjustment mechanism in this
model as they enable a redistribution from non-traders to traders in good times and from traders
to non-traders in bad times.
4.4 Monetary volatility under various rules
A third variable of interest is the volatility of money. Obviously, the cases to look for are: (1)
state-contingent rules and (2) xed exchange rate regime i.e., "  0. As before, we compare the
volatilities of the implied money growth rates.
4.4.1 State-contingent rule
Since the optimal state contingent rule is t =
yt y
y vtyt , to a second order approximation we have
E ftg =
v
(1  v)2
2y
y2
:
Likewise, a second order approximation for the variance yields
V ar ftg =
1
(1  v)2
2y
y2
: (58)
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4.4.2 Optimal devaluation rule
Under a xed rate of devaluation, ", the implied money growth rate is
1 + t = (1 + ")
(1  vt) yt
(1  vt 1) yt 1 :
Then, taking a second order approximation gives
E ftg = "+ (1 + ")
 
2vy + (1  2v)2y
y2 (1  v)2
!
;
while a second order approximation for the variance yields
V ar ftg u (1 + ")2
 
2vy + (1  2v)2y

y2 (1  v)2
0B@ 1 +
 
2vy + (1  2v)2y
 
1
y2(1 v)2 +

1 +
2vy+(1 2v)2y
y2(1 v)2
2
1CA : (59)
4.4.3 Comparison
>From (58) and (59), it is clear that when only velocity shocks are present (2y = 0), the state-
contingent rule is  = 0 for all times, and hence monetary volatility under an optimal devaluation
rule is the higher. However, when only output shocks are present
V ar ftgsc? V ar ftg~" i¤ 
1 + 
2y
y2
! 
1 +
2y
y2
! 
1 + 2y (1  v)2
 
1 +
2y
y2
!!
(1  v)27 1
Clearly, for v = 0; V ar ftgsc < V ar ftg~" : On the other hand, when v = 1; V ar ftgsc >
V ar ftg~". Since the LHS is decreasing in v, there exists v^, such that for all v > v^; the volatility
under state-contingent rule is higher than under optimal devaluation rule. Note that the smaller
are 2y,
2y
y2
; or ; the smaller will be v^.
5 Conclusion
This paper has examined optimal monetary policy in the context of a small open economy under
asset market segmentation. We have also assumed that traders have access to complete markets.
In this context, we have shown that there exist state contingent rules based on either the rate
of money growth and the rate of devaluation that can replicate the rst best equilibrium. These
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state contingent rules allow the monetary authority to stabilize non-tradersconsumption. While
these state contingent rules constitute the natural analytical benchmark, they would be di¢ cult
to implement in practice since they require responding to contemporaneous shocks. We therefore
examine non-state contingent rules based on either the money supply or the exchange rate and
conclude that money supply rules which allow for exchange rate exibility generally dominate
exchange rate rules in welfare terms. This would support arrangements that allow for some exchange
rate exibility rather than arrangements based on exchange rate pegs.
Our model has ignored the issue of endogeneity of market segmentation. In particular, one
would expect that agents endogenously choose to be traders or non-traders with the choice depend-
ing on the cost of participating in asset markets as well as the prevailing exchange rate and/or
monetary regime. However, we see no reason to believe that this would change our key results. As
should be clear from the intuition provided in the paper, what matters for our results is that, at
every point in time, some agents have access to assets market while others do not. What particular
agents have access to asset markets and whether this group changes over time should not alter the
essential arguments. A formal check of this conjecture is left for future work.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Welfare loss relative to the rst-best under ~
The expected consumption and variances of traders and nontraders are obtained from (33), (34),
and (36) as
cT =

1 +

1  


(1  v) 
1 + 

y;
E

cNTt

=
1 + v
1 + 
y;
V ar

cNTt

=

1
1 + 
2  
2y (1 + 2v) + 
22vy

: (60)
Using (60) and (39), we obtain the welfare loss, under ~ as
4W ~ =W fb  W ~
=

1   (1  )

1
1 + ~
2
y2
 
(1  v)2

~2 +
2y
y2
(1 + 2v~) + ~2
2vy
y2
!
Using (38) in the above expression, and after some algebra we obtain
4W ~ = 
1   (1  )
1 + 
(1 v)2
2
v

1 +
2y
y2

1 + 
(1 v)2
2
v

1 +
2y
y2

+ 
2y
y2
2y
which is equation (40) in the main text.
6.2 Riskless bonds for non-traders
This appendix discusses the case in which non-traders are able to access a non-state contingent bond.
We rst derive the optimal non-state contingent money growth rule and then the corresponding
exchange rate rule.
6.2.1 Optimal non-state contingent money growth rule
Allowing non-traders to trade in riskless bonds implies
cNTt =
MNTt
St
+ vtyt + (1 + r) bt   bt+1: (61)
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Now, non-traders maximize (1) subject to (61), and hence, their rst order condition implies
ct = Et fct+1g (62)
With a xed money growth rule (61) can be rewritten as
cNTt = z(1  vt)yt + vtyt + (1 + r) bt   bt+1: (63)
Taking (62) into account and iterating (63) forward, it can be shown that
cNTt = rbt + (1  )Zt +  Z (64)
where Zt = z(1  vt)yt + vtyt; Z = z(1  v)y + vy: Substituting (64) into (63) yields
bt+1 = bt + 
 
Zt   Z

(65)
For convenience, let b0 = 0: Then, it is easy to verify that
E

cNTt
	
= Z; 8 t;
V AR

cNTt
	
= r2V AR fbtg+ (1  )2 V AR fZg (66)
Further, using (65), it can be shown that
V AR fbtg = t2V AR fZg :
Substituting the above expression in (66), the variance component of non-traders lifetime utility
can be computed as
 V AR fZg :
Under a  rule, the traders consumption is same as that given by (34)
cTt = y

1 +

1  


(1  z) (1  v)

;
where we have assumed that k0 = 0. The optimal money growth rule is now obtained by solving
min
z
1
1  
n

 
E
 
cT
2
+ (1  )  E  cNT 2 + (1  ) (1  )V ar [Z]o ;
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where
V ar [Z] = z22y + (1  z)2 2vy + 2z (1  z) v2y;
and where 2vy = 
2
y
2
v + y
22v + v
22y. Then
~z =
2vy   v2y + (1 v)
2
(1 ) y
2
2vy + (1  2v)2y + (1 v)
2
(1 ) y
2
;
and
~ =
(1  v)2y
2vy +
(1 v)2y2
(1 )   v2y
: (67)
6.2.2 Optimal non-state contingent exchange rate rule
Using (61) obtain
cNTt = z(1  vt 1)yt 1 + vtyt + (1 + r) bt   bt+1: (68)
Using (62) it can be shown that
cNTt = rbt + (1  ) z(1  vt 1)yt 1 + (1  )Zt +  Z (69)
where Zt = vtyt + z(1  vt)yt, and Z = E fZg. Combining (69) with (68) yields
bt+1 = bt + z ((1  vt 1yt 1   (1  vt) yt)) + 
 
Zt   Z

(70)
>From (69):
V AR

cNTt
	
= r2V AR fbtg+ (1  )2
 
z2V AR f(1  v) yg+ V AR fZg
+2r (1  ) zCOV fbt; (1  vt 1) yt 1g (71)
>From (70):
V AR fb0g= 0;
V AR fb1g= 2V AR fvy   (1  ) z (1  v) yg ;
V AR fbtg= V AR fb1g+ (t  1)2V AR fZg (72)
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Combining (72) with (71) yields
V AR

cNTt
	
= (t+ 1)
 
1  2V AR fZg ; 8 t:
Then, the variance component of non-traders lifetime utility can be computed as
 V AR fZg :
Under an " rule, the traders consumption is given by
cTt = y

1 +

1  


(1  z) (1  v)

;
~z

 11+~"

is now obtained by solving
min
z
1
1  
n

 
E
 
cT
2
+ (1  )  E  cNT 2 + (1  ) (1  )V ar [Z]o ;
where
V ar [Z] = 2z22y + (1  z)2 2vy + 2z (1  z) v2y;
and where 2vy = 
2
y
2
v + y
22v + v
22y. Then
~z =

 
2vy   v2y

+ (1 v)
2
(1 ) y
2
2
 
2vy + (1  2v)2y

+ (1 v)
2
(1 ) y
2
;
~" =
2 (1  v)2y    (1  )
 
2vy   v2y


 
2vy   v2y

+ (1 v)
2y2
(1 )
: (73)
With velocity shocks only21
~" =
  (1  ) 2v
(1 v)2
 
2
v
(1 v)2 +
1
(1 )
< 0:
With output shocks only22
~" =
 v1 v + 
2
1
(1 )    v1 v
2y
y2
2y
y2
> 0
21Note that  r < " < 0. To see this, look at the rst order condition:
  (1  z) (1  v)
2
 (1  )    (1  z)
2
v = 0;
which implies that 1 < z < 1 + r.
22The inequality holds for v < 1
1+(1 )
2
y
y2
. Even for y
y
= 0:1,  = 1; and  = 0:5 (which maximizes  (1  )),
this requires v < 0:9975.
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6.3 Welfare Comparison
Qualitatively and as Figure 2 makes clear the results are the same as for the case without riskless
bonds for non-traders. The higher the monetary volatility, the more desirable is ~ for any given
y, while the higher the output volatility the more desirable is ~" for any given v. Quantitatively,
however, a comparison of Figures 1 and 2 clearly reveals that the relative attractiveness of exchange
rate rate rules increases. This is to be expected because as non-traders become more similarto
traders in terms of access to asset markets, the two regimes (money rules versus exchange rate
rules) should also lead to smaller welfare di¤erences. We would view this case, however, as an
extreme upper bound for the kind of access that non-traders may have in reality. Unfortunately,
more realistic arrangements (like just allowing cash to be carried over from period to period) are
analytically much less tractable.
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